Color Improves Speed of Processing But Not Perception in a Motion Illusion by Carolyn J. Perry & Mazyar Fallah
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 29 March 2012
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00092
Color improves speed of processing but not perception in
a motion illusion
Carolyn J. Perry 1,2 and Mazyar Fallah1,2,3*
1 Visual Perception and Attention Laboratory, School of Kinesiology and Health Science, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada
2 Centre for Vision Research, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada
3 Canadian Action and Perception Network, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada
Edited by:
Jeroen J. A. Van Boxtel, University of
California Los Angeles, USA
Reviewed by:
Eric Hiris, St. Mary’s College of
Maryland, USA
Kiley Seymour, Charité, Germany
*Correspondence:
Mazyar Fallah, School of Kinesiology
and Health Science, York University,
4700 Keele Street, Toronto, ON,
Canada M3J 1P3.
e-mail: mfallah@yorku.ca
When two superimposed surfaces of dots move in different directions, the perceived direc-
tions are shifted away from each other. This perceptual illusion has been termed direction
repulsion and is thought to be due to mutual inhibition between the representations of
the two directions. It has further been shown that a speed difference between the two
surfaces attenuates direction repulsion. As speed and direction are both necessary com-
ponents of representing motion, the reduction in direction repulsion can be attributed to
the additional motion information strengthening the representations of the two directions
and thus reducing the mutual inhibition. We tested whether bottom-up attention and top-
down task demands, in the form of color differences between the two surfaces, would also
enhance motion processing, reducing direction repulsion. We found that the addition of
color differences did not improve direction discrimination and reduce direction repulsion.
However, we did ﬁnd that adding a color difference improved performance on the task.
We hypothesized that the performance differences were due to the limited presentation
time of the stimuli. We tested this in a follow-up experiment where we varied the time of
presentation to determine the duration needed to successfully perform the task with and
without the color difference. As we expected, color segmentation reduced the amount of
time needed to process and encode both directions of motion.Thus we ﬁnd a dissociation
between the effects of attention on the speed of processing and conscious perception
of direction. We propose four potential mechanisms wherein color speeds ﬁgure-ground
segmentation of an object, attentional switching between objects, direction discrimina-
tion and/or the accumulation of motion information for decision-making, without affecting
conscious perception of the direction. Potential neural bases are also explored.
Keywords: attention, consciousness, awareness, color, motion, vision, illusion, perception
INTRODUCTION
In the study of attention and consciousness it is important to
operationally deﬁne the terms as there are multiple deﬁnitions
in the literature. We deﬁne attention as the preferential process-
ing of a subset of visual information selected either by bottom-
up (stimulus-driven) features or through goal-driven top-down
processes. Top-down or goal-driven attention is dependent on
task demands which require attending to a location, feature, or
object, and is dependent on fronto-parietal networks (Corbetta
et al., 1993; Nobre et al., 1997; Corbetta, 1998; Shulman et al.,
1999; Yantis and Serences, 2003; Serences et al., 2004; Kelley et al.,
2008; Ozaki, 2011) that modulate visual processing areas. Atten-
tional selection by bottom-up or stimulus-driven factors has also
been called pre-attentive processing or early (versus late) selec-
tion. All three nomenclatures describe feature differences that are
rapidly and easily processed, such as differences in contrast, hue,
orientation, form, or motion. Bottom-up attention is thought to
give rise to a map of attentional priority for each object in the ﬁeld
of view, either as a master salience map (Treisman and Gelade,
1980; Koch and Ullman, 1985; Neibur and Koch, 1996; Itti and
Koch, 2001; Thompson and Bichot, 2005) or at individual stages
of visual processing (e.g., Selective Tuning Model of attention,
Tsotsos et al., 1995). Bottom-up and top-down mechanisms work
together in driving attentional selection. The effects of attention
are often measured as either speeded processing which produces
faster reaction times in detection tasks (e.g., Posner, 1980) or as
improved visual sensitivity producing lower perceptual thresholds
(Mueller and Humphreys, 1991), smaller just-noticeable differ-
ences in feature processing (Nakayama and Mackeben, 1989), or
better signal-to-noise discrimination (Dosher and Lu, 2000).
Consciousness is the internal awareness, from near-threshold
awareness (Marks and Stevens, 1968; Azzopardi and Cowey, 1997;
Kunimoto et al., 2001) to full conscious experience, of visual input,
which is different than unconscious visual processing (as in blind-
sight,Weiskrantz, 1986; Azzopardi and Cowey, 1997, 1998; Stoerig
and Cowey, 1997). This deﬁnition is supported by studies that
quantify the strength of the conscious experience through conﬁ-
dence ratings (Kolb and Braun, 1995; Kunimoto et al., 2001; Boyer
et al., 2005; Wilimzig et al., 2008). Conscious awareness occurs
when a stimulus reaches a threshold and can then be focused upon
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or queried. At that stage, the features of the object can be processed
andbound into the object. It has been shown that different features
take differing amounts of time to be processed and reach aware-
ness: orientation is processed faster than color (e.g., Bodelon et al.,
2007) and color is processed faster than motion (Moutoussis and
Zeki, 1997). As each feature is processed, that feature of the object
reaches consciousness. Therefore being conscious of an object is
not a unitary experience: you can be conscious of different features
of the same object at different times (Dennett and Kinsbourne,
1992; Noe and O’Regan, 2002). Conscious awareness of an object
does not wait for the slowest feature of that object to be processed
(Bodelon et al., 2007). Thus there are two parts of consciousness
that canbe queried: awareness of the stimulus existing and the con-
scious perception of the feature.Muchof our conscious perception
is driven by visual processing as evidenced in a myriad of visual
illusions such as the waterfall illusion (Anstis et al., 1998), moon
illusion (Kaufman and Rock, 1962), McCollough effect (McCol-
lough,1965),Land effect (Land andMcCann,1971), andTitchener
circles (Pavani et al., 1999). These visual elements not only reach
conscious awareness, but are also consciously perceived as being
different than the veridical visual input. In multi-object tracking
(MOT), target objects can be tracked as they move amongst dis-
tractors but the features and identity of the objects are not well
processed (Scholl and Pylyshyn, 1999; Bahrami, 2003; Pylyshyn,
2004). Thus, conscious awareness of an object and perception of
its features can be dissociated from each other.
We can relate consciousness to the attentional literature: a sim-
ple detection task queries awareness whereas a discrimination task
queries perception. A number of paradigms including attentional
blink (Broadbent and Broadbent, 1987; Raymond et al., 1992),
change blindness (Rensink et al., 1997), inattentional blindness
(Rock et al., 1992), load-induced blindness (Lavie, 1995), and
visual neglect (Driver and Mattingley, 1998) have shown an appar-
ent failure of conscious awareness in the absence of attention
(for review see van Boxtel et al., 2010a). Attention also affects
objects that easily reach awareness: attentional effects on detec-
tion tasks are often measured by speed of response, i.e., reac-
tion time (e.g., spatial cueing paradigm: Posner, 1980). Other
studies have suggested that attention does not affect conscious
awareness directly, but instead affects the sensitivity of the visual
system. The presence of spatial attention improves contrast sen-
sitivity (Lee et al., 1999a; Carrasco et al., 2000; Reynolds et al.,
2000; Di Russo et al., 2001; Moore and Fallah, 2001, 2003, 2004).
The absence of attention results in a decrease in discrimina-
tion of luminance and color contrasts, orientation, and spatial
frequency (Lee et al., 1999b; Morrone et al., 2002, 2004). Fur-
thermore, spatial attention and increased contrast have similar
effects on neuronal ﬁring (Mangun et al., 1998; Boynton et al.,
1999; Reynolds and Desimone, 2003). However, it should be
noted that the effects of attention on visual sensitivity and neu-
ronal responses only occur when there are multiple stimuli to
be simultaneously processed (Spitzer et al., 1988; Desimone and
Duncan, 1995; McAdams and Maunsell, 2000; Martinez-Trujillo
and Treue, 2004; Reynolds and Fallah, 2004; Fallah et al., 2007;
Sundberg et al., 2009) and attention has little effect on sin-
gle stimuli (Luck et al., 1997; Moore and Fallah, 2004; Tsuchiya
and Braun, 2007). While these studies suggest that attention and
consciousness can be dissociated, it is still in contention which
attentional mechanisms give rise to awareness and which affect
perception.
Perceptual illusions have an advantage in the study of con-
sciousness in that the conscious percept is dissociated from the
physical stimulus and is instead created by neural processing (de
Gardelle et al., 2009, 2010). Instead of using post hoc conﬁdence
ratings, the strength of the illusion can be used to measure con-
sciousness. For example, prior research has used the strength
of the afterimages (Suzuki and Grabowecky, 2003; Hofstoetter
et al., 2004; van Boxtel et al., 2010b) to study the relationship
between attention and consciousness, Similarly, that relationship
is also studied with motion illusions (motion aftereffect: van de
Grind et al., 2001; Castelo-Branco et al., 2009; Kaunitz et al.,
2011; Murd and Bachmann, 2011; motion-induced mislocaliza-
tion: Tse et al., 2011). We used a different perceptual motion
illusion,direction repulsion (Marshak and Sekuler, 1979), to inves-
tigate the relationship between attention and consciousness. In
this illusion, observers perceive the directions of motion of two
superimposed surfaces as being repulsed away from each other.
The conscious experience of this event is a misrepresentation of
the actual motion directions, and occurs with superimposed ran-
dom dot kinetograms (Marshak and Sekuler, 1979; Mather and
Moulden, 1980; Hiris and Blake, 1996; Braddick et al., 2002; Cur-
ran andBenton,2003) or superimposed gratings (KimandWilson,
1996). The illusion is strong, producing a percept that is repulsed
up to 20˚ away from the real direction of each surface (Marshak
and Sekuler, 1979; Braddick et al., 2002). While the direction
of a sole surface is accurately perceived, the superimposition of
two surfaces is thought to produce a competition between the
representations of the two directions, a process termed mutual
inhibition which results in repulsion (Marshak and Sekuler, 1979;
Mather and Moulden, 1980). As stated previously, the effects
of attention on visual sensitivity are generally seen with mul-
tiple stimuli as single stimuli are processed with full resources.
Similarly, the competition between the two surfaces’ directions
interferes with their processing (Braddick et al., 2002) produc-
ing the repulsion. In the standard direction repulsion illusion,
all features of the surfaces are identical except for the direction.
So the ability to select one of the surfaces is based solely on
the direction information which is what produces the repulsion.
Additional feature differences between the surfaces would provide
other handles by which to select a surface. So attentional mecha-
nisms should reduce the interference between the two directions
and attenuate the repulsion, resulting in a more veridical percept.
A reduction in repulsion does in fact occur due to bottom-up
saliency produced by differences in speed (Marshak and Sekuler,
1979; Curran and Benton, 2003) or spatial frequency (Kim and
Wilson, 1996). When the surfaces are distinguished by speed or
spatial frequency differences, selection can work through those
features to reduce the illusion. However, a real depth difference
produced by stereoscopic viewing does not attenuate direction
repulsion (Hiris and Blake, 1996). When the two surfaces are in
the same depth plane, they are already perceived to be in differ-
ent apparent depth planes (Hiris and Blake, 1996). Therefore, the
addition of stereoscopic depth does not add additional features to
select by.
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Speed and spatial frequency, as well as direction and depth,
are all components of motion processing in the dorsal stream
(Maunsell and Van Essen, 1983a,b; Albright, 1984; Mikami et al.,
1986a,b;Van Essen andGallant, 1994; Bradley andAndersen, 1998;
DeAngelis and Newsome, 1999). Thus this bottom-up attentional
effect could be limited to concurrently processed motion features
processed by local circuitry within motion areas. Since report-
ing a second feature on the same object has been shown to not
require additional resources (Duncan, 1984), we asked whether
the addition of a motion-irrelevant feature processed in the ven-
tral stream, such as color, could also attenuate direction repulsion.
A salient color difference allows for selection of the objects, not just
the concurrently processed motion information. Thus, we tested
whether bottom-up attention (in the form of color segmentation)
reduces direction repulsion in local motion circuits or at the level
of binding color to motion. In the unicolor condition, participants
reported the two directions of motion (similar to the procedure
in Braddick et al., 2002, Experiment 2). In the color-segmented
condition, participants reported the combination of color and
direction, thus also activating top-down mechanisms involved in
selecting objects by color. We tested whether bottom-up segmen-
tation and top-down task demands involving one feature of an
object would affect the conscious perception of other features of
the object.
Both the unicolor and color-segmented conditions required
top-down attention to the direction of the objects. We activated
bottom-up attentional mechanisms by the use of color segmen-
tation cues and also added the top-down attentional demand of
linking eachdirection to the color of the surface.Note that bottom-
up attention is not as often studied with regard to consciousness
as it requires comparison between conditions that have differ-
ent physical stimulus properties, whereas top-down attention can
be allocated differently to the same visual scene, either as spatial
(Jonides, 1981; Egeth and Yantis, 1997; Driver, 2001; Rodriguez-
Sanchez et al., 2007; Tsotsos, 2011), feature-based (Treue and
Martinez-Trujillo, 1999; Saenz et al., 2002; Tsotsos, 2011), or
object-based attention (Valdes-Sosa et al., 1998, 2000; O’Craven
et al., 1999; Fallah et al., 2007). Bottom-up attention is therefore
expected to be linked with conscious perception, which is likely
why the addition of speed or spatial frequency differences atten-
uate direction repulsion (Marshak and Sekuler, 1979; Kim and
Wilson, 1996; Curran and Benton, 2003). Furthermore the ventral
stream which processes color has the function of processing vision
for perception, i.e., consciousness (Goodale andMilner, 1992;Mil-
ner and Goodale, 1993). For these reasons, we expected that the
addition of color segmentation cueswould also attenuate direction
repulsion. Surprisingly, we found that the addition of color differ-
ences did not affect direction repulsion. While not affecting the
conscious perception of surface direction, this attentional cueing
did in fact have an effect on visual processing: color decreased the
time needed to process both directions of motion. While speeded
reaction time is a well-studied effect of visual attention (Posner,
1980; Jonides, 1981; Driver, 2001, for review see Egeth and Yan-
tis, 1997), here we have shown that speeded visual processing can
be dissociated from the perceptual outcome of that processing.
Finally,we relate these ﬁndings to possible underlyingmechanisms
and attentional networks.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
In Experiment 1, six participants (ages 21–47, two female) com-
pleted the unicolor: white paradigm, six participants (age 18–31,
one female) completed the unicolor: red or green paradigm, and
six participants (ages 20–26, two female) completed the color-
segmented paradigm. In Experiment 2, an additional 24 naïve
individuals participated: 12 in the unicolor paradigm (ages 18–27,
three female) and 12 in the color-segmented paradigm (ages 19–
26,10 female).All participants hadnormal or corrected-to-normal
visual acuity, and none tested positive for color blindness using
Ishihara plates. The research was approved by York University’s
Human Research Participation Committee. Informed consent was
obtained from all participants.
PROCEDURE
Participants sat in a darkened, quiet room, 57 cm away from
a computer monitor (21′′ ViewSonic, 1280× 1024 resolution,
60Hz) with their head position stabilized by a headrest (Headspot,
UHCOtech). They wore a head-mounted, infrared eye tracker
(Eyelink II, SR Research Ltd., 500Hz) monitoring right eye posi-
tion. Stimuli were created using Matlab (The Mathworks Corp.).
Experimental control was maintained by Presentation (Neurobe-
havioral Systems).Datawas analyzedusingMatlab andSPSS (SPSS
Inc.).
Participants ﬁxated awhite cross centered on a black screen (see
Figure 1). After 200ms, a circular aperture appeared in the lower
right quadrant. The aperture consisted of two superimposed,
100% coherent random dot kinetograms (RDKs: dot size= 0.04˚,
aperture size= 5˚,dot density= 1.54 dots/degree2, velocity= 3˚/s)
moving in two different directions. We tested all combinations of
one direction drawn from the vertical axis (±2˚, 6˚, and 10˚ from
either up or down) and the other from the horizontal axis (±2˚,
6˚, and 10˚ from either left or right). While all directions appeared
with equal frequency, this created differences between the two
directions that ranged from 70˚ to 110˚. If ﬁxation was broken
the trial was aborted and randomly reinserted into the remaining
trials. After a period of time (Experiment 1: 1000ms, Experiment
2: variable, see below), the aperture was replaced with a circu-
lar outline (response circle) on which the participants indicated
the directions of motion of each surface by mouse clicks. In the
unicolor: white paradigm, both surfaces were white (24.4 cd/m2)
as was the response circle. In the unicolor: red or green par-
adigm, both surfaces were either red or green (red: x = 11.97,
y = 24.37; green: x = 46.37, y = 24.38; isoluminant, 24.4 cd/m2),
pseudorandomly interleaved. In the color-segmented paradigm,
one surface was red and the other was green (red: x = 11.97,
y = 24.37; green: x = 46.37, y = 24.38; isoluminant, 24.4 cd/m2).
Participants responded on sequential colored circles whose order
was randomly interleaved across trials.
In Experiment 1, the unicolor: white paradigm resulted in a
12 (Surface 1 Direction)× 12 (Surface 2 Direction) experimental
design. The unicolor: red or green paradigm resulted in a 12 (Sur-
face 1 Direction)× 12 (Surface 2 Direction)× 2 (Surface Color)
design. The color-segmented paradigm resulted in a 12 (Surface
1 Direction)× 12 (Surface 2 Direction)× 2 (Surface Color)× 2
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental paradigm. In both the unicolor and
color-segmented conditions participants initially ﬁxated a central white “+.”
After ﬁxation was maintained for 200ms an aperture containing two
superimposed, coherently moving random dot kinetograms, appeared in
the lower right quadrant. In Experiment 1, stimulus duration was set at
1000ms while in Experiment 2, stimulus duration was varied. Participants
were to remain ﬁxated during stimulus presentation. A response circle
replaced the surfaces, and participants were then free to move their eyes.
In the unicolor condition participants made two mouse clicks on the same
white response circle indicating the perceived directions of motion. In the
color-segmented condition, there were two response circles, one appearing
after the other (randomly interleaved). Participants clicked once on each to
indicate the perceived direction of motion of that colored surface.
(ResponseOrder: green then red, or red then green) design. Partic-
ipants completed a practice block of 10 trials, and then performed
288 trials in one of the unicolor paradigms or 576 trials in the
color-segmented paradigm.
In Experiment 2, stimulus duration was varied using a staircase
design. Based on pilot data, the starting unicolor stimulus dura-
tion was 2000ms and the color-segmented stimulus duration was
1000ms. Eachblock contained eight trials at a given stimulus dura-
tion. If performance was ≥87.5% (7/8), the stimulus duration was
decreased in the next block. Otherwise the duration was not long
enough to perform the task at criterion, and the stimulus duration
increased. The staircase had two stages; in the ﬁrst the stimulus
duration increased or decreased by a step size of 500ms. Upon a
double reversal, the staircase switched to stage two with a 100-ms
step size. The staircase ended when stage two produced a double
reversal or the 1 h session was completed. The time required to
process both directions correctly was taken as the average between
the ﬁnal two durations at the staircase plateau.
DATA ANALYSIS
Correct perceptual responses for directions one and two were
deﬁned as being those that fell within a range that extended
from halfway between the two directions to 45˚ away from the
real directions (Figure 2). This was to account for variability
in participant’s responses due to repulsion effects. In order to
compare them, correct responses in the color-segmented para-
digm were computed the same way as in the unicolor paradigms:
the two direction responses were deemed correct or incorrect
without regard to whether the directions matched the correct
color surface. In essence, this was analyzing performance in the
FIGURE 2 | Response range of an example participant with correct and
error ranges indicated. Shown are all the both-correct responses one
participant made to surfaces that were moving at between 170–190˚ and
260–280˚. Note that the responses are repulsed away from each other and
from the real directions. Overlaid are the ranges used to determine the
both-correct, one-wrong and both-wrong rates for surfaces moving at 170˚
and 280˚. Correct ranges were deﬁned as halfway between the two
directions to ±45˚. One-wrong rates then were trials in which participants
clicked on the response circle within the correct range for either direction
one or direction two, and made a second response within the error range.
Both-wrong rates were based on trials in which participants made both
clicks on the response circle within the error range.
color-segmented paradigm as if the color of the surfaces were
irrelevant. For all paradigms, only trials in which both directions
were correct were included in the direction repulsion analysis. The
perceived angle was the difference between the two response direc-
tions. Direction repulsion was computed as the difference between
the perceived angle and the actual angle difference between the
two directions of motion. Positive values indicated direction
repulsion.
In Experiment 1, performance was also calculated, measur-
ing the rate at which participants: responded correctly to both
surfaces (both-correct), responded correctly to one surface (one-
wrong), and were unable to respond correctly to either surface
(both-wrong). We also calculated total error rate which included
all trials in which participants got either one response or both
responses incorrect (total error rate= 1− both-correct rate).
Means were calculated for each variable: direction repulsion,
both-correct, one-wrong, both-wrong, total error, and stimulus
duration. Independent t -tests were performed for direction repul-
sion and stimulus duration analyses comparing means in the
unicolor versus the color-segmented paradigms. As the error rates
may violate the normality assumptions underlying the t -test, we
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performed Wilcoxon rank-sum tests on both-correct, one-wrong,
both-wrong, and total errors between the paradigms.
RESULTS
EXPERIMENT 1
We hypothesized that direction repulsion would be attenuated
with the addition of a different color to each of the surfaces as
this would further segment the surfaces making them more dis-
tinct from one another. We expected no difference between the
two unicolor paradigms.
It is important to remove errors caused by guessing from our
repulsion analysis, because guesses, as outliers, would be inde-
pendent of the repulsion effect but would skew the distribution
means. Therefore, correct ranges were set a priori based on previ-
ous literature (Marshak and Sekuler, 1979; Mather and Moulden,
1980; Hiris and Blake, 1996; Braddick et al., 2002) which showed
peak single surface repulsions of ∼20˚ with an angular difference
between the two real directions of 22.5˚. In our range of 70–110˚
angular differences, those studies found a mean repulsion of 3–
9˚. In addition, if a participant did not fully process one of the
directions of motion, they were still required to respond, thus
forcing guesses. As we presented directions ±2˚, 6˚, 10˚ from each
of the four cardinal directions, guesses should therefore be clus-
tered around the cardinal directions.Weused a cutoff of +45˚ (half
the distance between the correct direction and the closest cardinal
direction) which encompasses the mean repulsions seen in prior
research and excludes guesses at the remaining cardinal directions.
Figure 2 depicts the correct and error ranges for an example pair
of directions. To determine if the cutoff was appropriate, we plot-
ted the distribution of responses for an example participant from
each of the unicolor and color-segmented conditions (Figure 3).
The responses show multiple distinct distributions. The distribu-
tion around the actual direction of motion (normalized to 0˚) falls
within the 45˚ cutoff and is shifted to the right, consistent with
direction repulsion. Trials outside this range, considered error tri-
als in our analysis, show clustering around repulsion magnitudes
of 90˚ and 180˚, consistent with guessing around the remaining
cardinal directions.
The motion processing system is generally considered to be
color-blind (Maunsell and Van Essen, 1983a,b; Shipp and Zeki,
1985; Zeki et al., 1991), however a few recent studies have sug-
gested that color and motion processing may be linked (Croner
and Albright, 1997, 1999; Tchernikov and Fallah, 2010). There-
fore, we ﬁrst tested whether the addition of color itself affected
direction processing by comparing the unicolor: white and uni-
color: red or green paradigms. We found no signiﬁcant differ-
ences in any of our measures: Direction Repulsion [t (10)= 0.84,
p= 0.42], Both-Correct rates (W s = 31.00, z =−1.28, p = 0.24),
One-Wrong rates (W s = 30.00, z =−1.44, p = 0.18), Both-Wrong
rates (W s = 33.5, z =−0.89, p = 0.39), and Total Error rates
(W s = 31.00, z =−1.28, p = 0.24). We collapsed the two unicolor
paradigms for the remaining analyses.
We next compared the color-segmented paradigm to the com-
bined unicolor paradigms. On correct trials, mean direction
repulsion in the unicolor paradigm (7.32± 1.45˚) did not differ
signiﬁcantly from the color-segmented paradigm [7.45± 3.50˚,
t (16)=−0.04, p = 0.97 – see Figure 4]. The addition of color
segmentation cues did not affect motion perception, speciﬁcally
the illusory direction repulsion. However, participants’ perfor-
mance, that is their ability to correctly determine both direc-
tions, was signiﬁcantly higher in the presence of color seg-
mentation cues (93.3± 0.75%) versus the unicolor condition
(80.48± 2.74%; W s = 83.00, z =−2.90, p = 0.002). This is also
shown in the total error rate (proportion of trials in which
the participant responded incorrectly to either one or both of
the directions – see Figure 5). There was a signiﬁcant decrease
(W s = 26.00, z =−2.90, p = 0.002) in the total error rate in the
color-segmented condition (6.67± 0.75%) compared to the uni-
color condition (19.52± 2.74%). To determine what was dri-
ving the difference in performance, error trials were broken
down into two categories: when only one direction was incor-
rectly determined (One-Wrong) or when both were incorrectly
determined (Both-Wrong). There was a signiﬁcant difference
in Both-Wrong error rates (W s = 31.00, z =−2.45, p = 0.013)
between the unicolor (1.97 ± 0.57%) and the color-segmented
(0.17± 0.06%) conditions (Figure 5). TheBoth-Wrong error rates
FIGURE 3 | Example distributions of repulsion magnitude. (A)
Unicolor, (B) Color-segmented. Responses are plotted for one participant
in each paradigm. The real direction of motion was normalized to 0˚
repulsion (black vertical line). The +45˚cutoff is depicted by the red dashed
line. Responses outside of this range are indicated in red and were
classiﬁed as errors. Note the majority of responses fall within the correct
range. The errors are distributed around 90˚ and 180˚, consistent with
guessing the remaining cardinal directions.
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FIGURE 4 | Direction repulsion in Experiment 1.There was no signiﬁcant
change in direction repulsion between the unicolor (7.32±1.45˚) and
color-segmented (7.45±3.50˚) paradigms [t (16)=−0.04, p =0.97]. Error
bars depict SEM.
were under 2%, thus participants were able to process at least
one of the directions on nearly every trial (Unicolor: 98.03%,
Color-Segmented: 99.8%). Note that the∼2% difference in Both-
Wrong error rates between the conditions was a small proportion
of the difference in overall performance (Unicolor: 80.48%,Color-
Segmented: 93.3%). Instead, the addition of color segmentation
cues improved performance by signiﬁcantly reducing the One-
Wrong error rate (Unicolor: 17.55± 2.26%, Color-Segmented:
6.5± 0.75%; W s = 26.00, z =−2.90, p = 0.002; Figure 5). While
direction repulsion was not affected by the presence of color
segmentation cues, the ability to process not just one but both
directions was signiﬁcantly improved.
EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 1, participants were able to correctly determine
the direction of one of the surfaces whether or not color dif-
ferences were present. The addition of color segmentation cues
signiﬁcantly improved participants’ ability to process the second
direction of motion,without affecting the direction repulsion illu-
sion.We hypothesized that the addition of color may have speeded
processing without affecting perception, even though there was
the added task demand of associating direction with color. In
Experiment 1, the stimuli were presented for 1000ms, which was
sufﬁcient time to perform the task when the surfaces were seg-
mented by color, but apparently not enough time to process both
unicolor surfaces. In Experiment 2,we varied the duration of stim-
ulus presentation to determine how much time was necessary to
process both directions with andwithout color segmentation cues.
We predicted that without color segmentation cues, a presentation
FIGURE 5 | Error rates for Experiment 1.There was a signiﬁcant decrease
in total error rate (Ws =26.00, z =−2.90, p =0.002) in the color-segmented
condition (black bars; 6.67±0.75%) compared to the unicolor condition
(white bars) 19.52±2.74%). One-wrong errors accounted for the majority
of the total error rate and had a corresponding signiﬁcant decrease
(Ws =26.00, z =−2.90, p =0.002) in the color-segmented condition
(6.51±0.75%) compared to the unicolor condition (17.55±2.26%). The
both-wrong rate, while showing a signiﬁcant difference (Ws =31.00,
z =−2.45, p =0.013) between the color-segmented (0.17±0.06%) and
unicolor (1.97±0.57%), accounted for only a very small portion of the total
error trials. Errors bars are SEM.
time of greater than 1000ms would be necessary to process both
directions of motion.
Consistent with Experiment 1, there was no signiﬁcant differ-
ence in direction repulsion between the unicolor (14.02 ± 1.39˚)
and color-segmented (13.79± 1.54˚) conditions [t (22)= 0.12,
p = 0.91 – see Figure 6A]. We performed an omnibus direction
repulsion analysis using a 2 (Experiment 1 versus 2)× 2 (Segmen-
tation: Unicolor versus Color-segmented) ANOVA. There was a
signiﬁcant main effect of Experiment (p = 0.001), but no main
effect of Segmentation (p = 0.82) nor a signiﬁcant interaction
(p = 0.87). It is also possible that due to the between-subjects
design, the repulsion magnitude difference is based upon group
differences between the participants in Experiments 1 and 2. How-
ever, it is unlikely that randomassignment of 42participantswould
result in such a large and signiﬁcant difference. The repulsion
magnitude difference is more likely due to differences in the two
experimental paradigms. In Experiment 1, the timing is set and
known, whereas in Experiment 2, it is variable. We can only spec-
ulate that this may produce different levels of alertness and/or
arousal resulting in the magnitude differences. It is important
to note that while there is a difference in direction repulsion
magnitude between the two experiments, the addition of color
segmentation, within each experiment, did not affect direction
repulsion.
As expected, participants required less than 1000ms to process
both directions when the surfaces were segmented by color
(841.7± 150.5ms). In the unicolor condition, participants on
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FIGURE 6 | Direction repulsion and stimulus duration results for
Experiment 2. (A) As in Experiment 1, there was no signiﬁcant
modulation of direction repulsion with the addition of color (13.79±1.54˚)
when compared to the unicolor (14.02±1.39˚) condition [t (22)=0.12,
p =0.91]. (B) Participants required signiﬁcantly less time in the
color-segmented paradigm (841.7±150.5ms) than in the unicolor
paradigm (1487.5±208.5ms) to correctly process both directions
[t (22)=2.51, p =0.02]. Error bars are SEM.
average required 1488ms to process both directions of motion
(1487.5± 208.5ms). The presentation time required in the uni-
color condition was signiﬁcantly longer than in the color-
segmented condition [t (22)= 2.51, p = 0.02 – see Figure 6B].
This difference in timing supports the results of Experiment 1.
Color segmentation enabled processing both directions of motion
within 1000ms (93%performance), but in the unicolor condition,
participants were not always able to process the second surface’s
direction (80%performance). Thus, the addition of color segmen-
tation cues, providing an additional feature by which to select a
surface, signiﬁcantly speeded processing in the motion discrimi-
nation taskwithout affecting conscious perception of the direction
repulsion illusion.
DISCUSSION
In the direction repulsion illusion, previous work has shown
that conscious misperception of motion direction can be altered
through the use of bottom-up segmentation cues, which are
thought to reduce the effect of mutual inhibition between the
superimposed objects. When the objects were distinguished from
each other by differences in speed (Marshak and Sekuler, 1979;
Curran and Benton, 2003) or spatial frequency (Kim and Wilson,
1996), direction repulsion was reduced resulting in a more realis-
tic conscious experience. Note that speed and spatial frequency are
co-processed with direction in motion-sensitive visual areas, such
as area MT, in the dorsal visual processing stream (for review, see
Born and Bradley, 2005). Evidence suggests that motion process-
ing is segregated along different speed (Edwards et al., 1998) or
spatial frequency channels (Kim and Wilson, 1993). Thus, direc-
tion repulsion could be attenuated by segregating the objects by
different speed (Curran and Benton, 2003) or spatial frequency
channels (Kim and Wilson, 1996). As superimposed transparent
surfaces are automatically perceived as being at different apparent
depths, additionally segmenting the surfaces by stereoscopic depth
does not attenuate direction repulsion (Hiris and Blake, 1996). We
hypothesized that distinguishing two superimposed objects by a
feature processed outside of the dorsal stream, providing both
bottom-up segmentation cues and an additional top-down task
demand, should also attenuate direction repulsion. Such a ﬁnd-
ing would be consistent with attention to an object strengthening
the conscious representation of all the features of that object. In
contrast, our ﬁndings show that conscious perception of motion
direction is unaffected: direction repulsion was no different when
the objects were additionally segmented by color versus when they
were the same color. This result suggests that color cues had no
effect on motion processing: computing direction was blind to
the color of the moving object. While illusory perception of the
direction repulsion was not affected, we did ﬁnd that participants’
ability to process both objects’ directions of motion in a set period
of timewas improvedwith the addition of color.When the surfaces
were only segmented by direction (unicolor condition), one of the
directions of motion did not always reach conscious awareness.
But color segmentation brought both directions of motion into
conscious awareness. We hypothesized that color sped processing
in the task, similar to how attentional facilitation speeds reaction
times. Speeded processing would allow the direction computation
to complete and enter conscious awareness, without affecting the
perceived direction. In Experiment 2, we varied the presentation
duration to test this hypothesis and determine how much time
was necessary to process both objects’ directions with and without
color cues. Color segmentation did indeed speed visual process-
ing, resulting in participants requiring less time (color-segmented:
∼840ms; unicolor: ∼1490ms) to fully process the directions of
motion of both objects. These timings were consistent with the
results of Experiment 1 that used a set 1000ms stimulus dura-
tion. Therefore, while determining the global motion direction of
colored, coherently moving dots requires a hierarchical object rep-
resentation, attention to one feature of the object (color) did not
modify the conscious percept of other features of the object (direc-
tion of motion). However, segmentation by that feature did speed
processing of other features, allowing them to enter conscious
awareness more quickly.
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SPEEDED PROCESSING AND REACTION TIME STUDIES
Our results suggest that the representation of an object’s features
in conscious perception is independent of the speed at which
the neural circuitry processes that sensory input. A number of
spatial attention studies have focused on detection tasks where
performance is at ceiling (e.g., the precueing paradigm, Posner,
1980). The effect of spatial attention is then measured as changes
in the speed of response, termed reaction time. As the strength and
quality of the sensory input is already high, attention is thought
to speed visual processing in these paradigms. Behavioral stud-
ies of non-spatial object-based attention using superimposition
(e.g., Duncan, 1984; Valdes-Sosa et al., 1998, 2000; Reynolds et al.,
2003) have generally measured accuracy of discrimination judg-
ments and thus have not investigated effects on processing speed
(but see Tipper, 2001, for a review of negative priming: slower
reaction times resulting from distractor inhibition). Our results
are consistent with attentional speeding of visual processing, but
we also show that it is not limited to spatial attention because the
surfaces are superimposed. In fact, we recently performed a reac-
tion time precueing study using superimposed surfaces (Fallah et
al., under review). In that study, non-spatial object-based atten-
tion modulated response times, supporting the point that speeded
visual processing is not limited to spatial attention.
PRE-ATTENTIVE PROCESSING
We have suggested that color segmentation speeds motion pro-
cessing due to attentional mechanisms because attention has been
shown to speed visual processing (e.g., reaction times). However,
it is also possible that color segmentation increased the speed of
motion processing through pre-attentive mechanisms. That is, the
effects of color segmentation could have been due to feed-forward
pre-attentive processing of the motion direction and not been
reliant on attentional feedback. This would occur if color and
motion are bound prior to or during motion processing. As addi-
tional time is required to bind different features together (Bodelon
et al., 2007), linking color and motion pre-attentively would need
to provide a larger speed advantage than that cost. Due to the mag-
nitude of the beneﬁt seen with color segmentation in this task, it is
possible that more than one mechanism is in effect. In the follow-
ing discussion of the different stages of visual processing wherein
color segmentation could potentially speed motion processing, we
will highlight which mechanisms rely on pre-attentive or attentive
processing.
TIMING MODELS
This task required top-down and bottom-up attention along with
visual processing, working memory and hierarchical object pro-
cessing. As such, there are a number of stages of processing
required to perform the task, but we are only focusing on the
stages necessary during the presentation of the stimuli and not
the memory retrieval and response stages. We propose two pos-
sible models: one based on serial processing and another based
on parallel processing. The serial model is based on prior studies
that have shown people are impaired at simultaneously process-
ing features on two different, superimposed objects (Neisser and
Becklen, 1975; Duncan, 1984; Blaser et al., 2000), and thus may
select and process one object before switching and processing the
other object. Alternatively, the directions of both objects could
be processed in parallel. Figure 7A depicts the necessary stages
of processing in the serial model. Participants ﬁrst need time to
separate the dots into two different objects (SG: segmentation
time), in order to process the direction of the ﬁrst object (D1:
direction discrimination of object 1). Note that processing the
direction includes motion processing, decision-making and stor-
age in working memory. The time to complete these two stages is
the time needed to completely process the ﬁrst object (T1: time
to process direction 1). Once the ﬁrst object is processed, partici-
pants need to disengage attention from this object and switch their
attention to the second object (SW: switch). Then the direction of
the second object can be determined (D2). T2 is the time needed
to accomplish these two (SW and D2) stages. Completing all of
the stages is the time needed to determine the direction of both
objects. In the parallel model (Figure 7E), the dots are also initially
segmented into two separate objects (SG). Then both directions
are processed in parallel (D1 and D2). The parallel direction pro-
cessing may occur at equal rates or one may complete before the
other, consistent with our one-correct rates. Whether the process
is serial or parallel, color segmentation may increase the speed
of processing at one or more of these stages. We propose three
models wherein different stages of processing may be speeded by
the addition of color cues. We also review possible anatomical
underpinnings of each.
Segmentation
The ﬁrst model is based on color speeding segmentation (SG) of
the dots into two superimposed objects, resulting in a decrease
in the total time required to perform the task. This could
occur through pre-attentive processing and affect both the serial
(Figure 7B) and parallel (Figure 7F) mechanisms. In this para-
digm, segmentation is mainly dependent on the Gestalt principle
of common fate: items that move together are grouped together
(e.g., Blake and Lee, 2005). Two ﬁelds of dots that are super-
imposed but not moving appear as a single surface, whether or
not they differ in color. It is the motion of the dots that seg-
ments them into two superimposed objects. It is at this stage that
the two superimposed objects, but not the directions of motion,
enter conscious awareness. The addition of color cues increases
the strength of segmentation between the two objects. It may be
that in addition to increasing the segmentation strength, color
cues also speed the segmentation process by grouping the dots
into two objects more efﬁciently. Color and motion are processed
separately, starting with different photoreceptors in the retina and
continuing through separate functional areas in cortex (Unger-
leider and Mishkin, 1982; Goodale and Milner, 1992; Milner and
Goodale, 1993). In cortical visual processing the ventral stream is
sensitive to color, whereas the dorsal stream is sensitive to motion.
Color could affect motion segmentation through the anatomi-
cal links between area V4, which represents perceived color, and
area MT, which processes motion (Ungerleider and Haxby, 1994).
As color is processed faster than motion (Moutoussis and Zeki,
1997), it therefore would be available to aid in grouping the dots
and segmenting the objects by motion. Such color–motion inter-
action would occur during early pre-attentive visual processing.
While prior research has suggested that area MT may use color
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FIGURE 7 |Task processing and timing models. Serial models are depicted
in (A–D). (A) Shows the time components involved in processing the
directions of both surfaces. T1, the time to process the direction of one
surface, is divided into the time needed to segment the surfaces (SG), and
the time to discriminate the direction (D1). T2, the time to process the
direction of the other surface, is divided into the time needed to disengage
attention from surface one and instead attend to the other surface, i.e., switch
(SW), and the time required to distinguish the direction of surface two (D2).
(B) Faster segmentation hypothesis; the time needed to segment (SG) the
surfaces decreases with the addition of a color difference, thus decreasing
the amount of time to process surface one (T1), and the total time needed to
perform the task. (C) Faster motion processing hypothesis; the addition of
color reduces the time needed to process the direction of each surface.
Again, the total time needed to perform the task decreases. (D) Faster
attentional switch hypothesis; color reduces the amount of time required to
disengage attention from surface 1 and switch to processing surface 2 (SW),
thus reducing the time needed to process the second surface (T2), and the
total time needed to perform the task. Parallel models are depicted in (E–G).
This would eliminate the need to switch attention between objects, leaving
decreased segmentation time (F), and faster motion processing (G), as
possible mechanisms through which decreased processing time in the
color-segmented paradigm could occur.
to segment moving dots (Croner and Albright, 1997; Born and
Bradley, 2005), this study suggests that color may also speed the
segmentation by motion process. Since increased discriminability
of a texture-deﬁned object only speeds segmentation time by up to
25ms (Caputo and Casco, 1999), it is not likely that color affecting
SG alone can account for the total difference in processing time.
Sensory processing
The second model is based on color speeding motion process-
ing, resulting in a decrease in both D1 and D2. This would affect
both the serial (Figure 7C) and parallel (Figure 7G) mechanisms.
Historically motion processing was thought to be color-blind
(Maunsell and Van Essen, 1983a,b; Shipp and Zeki, 1985; Zeki
et al., 1991), especially since the dorsal stream that processes
motion only receives magnocellular (rod) input and not parvo-
cellular (cone) input. More recently, evidence is accumulating that
color can affect motion processing, possibly through cross-talk
connections between areas V4 and MT (Ungerleider and Des-
imone, 1986). For example, Croner and Albright (1997, 1999)
found that direction discrimination was enhanced when distrac-
tors were distinguished by color. More recently, Tchernikov and
Fallah (2010) found that color modulated the speed of smooth
pursuit eye movements, thought to be dependent on motion pro-
cessing in area MT (Lisberger and Ferrera, 1997; Recanzone and
Wurtz, 1999). Thus color processing within the ventral stream has
both anatomical and functional connectivitywithmotion process-
ing in the dorsal stream. The outstanding question is how do those
connections speed processing without affecting the perception of
motion?
In order to process motion, MT ﬁrst needs to associate the
identity of each dot across two frames (aliasing – Snowden and
Braddick, 1990), and then use Gestalt rules of common fate to
group dots with common motion directions into the two global
objects. The common color of dots within the same object may
speed processing by reducing the aliasing options; each dot has
half as many possible matches across frames of motion in the
color-segmented than in the unicolor condition. This could either
occur through pre-attentive processing if color segregates motion
input early in the visual processing stream, by top-down atten-
tional selection through color ﬁltering (Croner andAlbright, 1997,
1999), or by bottom-up attention as surfaces provide an advan-
tage over lower-level features in visual search (He and Nakayama,
1992). Concurrent direction judgments of superimposed surfaces
are based on the global motion representations of each surface
(Braddick et al., 2002). We suggest that it is the global motion
processing of each surface that is affected by color segmenta-
tion. Then, once each surface’s direction is determined, mutual
inhibition between the populations of neurons representing each
direction shifts the perceived directions away from each other.
Thus, time to process may be affected by color segmentation in
this task, without affecting the conscious misperception of the
directions of the objects.
Alternatively, it may be possible to speed the decision-making
process. Direction judgments have been shown to be based on area
MT processing motion information (Albright, 1984;Mikami et al.,
1986a,b; Newsome and Pare, 1988; Salzman et al., 1992) and pass-
ing the information along to area LIP which accumulates the evi-
dence to reach a decision threshold (accumulator model: Shadlen
and Newsome, 1996, 2001; Huk and Shadlen, 2005; Palmer et al.,
2005). LIP also receives color information directly fromareaV4, an
intermediate stage of feature processing in the ventral visual stream
(Ungerleider and Haxby, 1994). In this model, area MT contains
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direction processing circuitry, including that of mutual inhibition
which produces direction repulsion, and passes the two misper-
ceived directions to LIP which accumulates this information over
time. In the unicolor condition, segmentation occurs solely on the
basis of motion direction and thus the direction of one surface
interferes with the accumulation of direction information for the
other surface. This leads to a “noisy walk” toward threshold (e.g.,
Palmer et al., 2005). When the motion information is separated by
color, focusing on a single color reduces the noise produced by the
other surface’s direction which increases the slope of accumula-
tion, resulting in a faster approach to the decision threshold. Note
that this would occur after mutual inhibition in area MT pro-
duces the misperceived directions. The accumulator model can
account for differences in reaction time based on the strength of
the motion stimulus (motion coherence) and for speed–accuracy
tradeoffs (Palmer et al., 2005).Wehypothesize that attention,using
color segmentation, gates direction information after motion pro-
cessing which leads to speeded decision-making (accumulator
model) without affecting conscious perception (direction repul-
sion). While our experiments cannot determine whether motion
processing or decision-making occur faster, future studies can test
these hypotheses by performing neuronal recordings in areas MT
and LIP.
Attentional switching
The third model is based on color differences producing faster
attentional switching between objects; seen as a decrease in SW
and thus T2 time. This model only affects the serial mechanism
(Figure 7D), as there is no attentional switching in the parallel
model. Switching attention between objects at a given location has
best been studied in the attentional blink paradigm. In attentional
blink, it has been shown that being able to switch one’s atten-
tion between serially presented objects is limited when the objects
appear within ∼100–500ms of each other (Shapiro et al., 2009).
Color segmentation provides an additional feature by which to
select a surface, which could produce an advantage of up to a few
hundred milliseconds.
Attentional control is thought to be mediated by distinct ven-
tral and dorsal attention networks (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002;
Shulman et al., 2002; Sridharan et al., 2007). The dorsal attention
network is involved in top-down control of attention to locations,
objects, and features (Corbetta et al., 1993; Nobre et al., 1997;
Corbetta, 1998; Shulman et al., 1999; Yantis and Serences, 2003;
Serences et al., 2004; Kelley et al., 2008; Ozaki, 2011). The dorsal
attention network has also been shown to be driven by bottom-up
attentional cues relating to motion but not by color cues (Shulman
et al., 2002; d’Avossa et al., 2003), whereas color saliency activates
occipitotemporal regions instead (Kincade et al., 2005). While
attentional switching activates both attention networks (Corbetta
andShulman,2002; Serences et al., 2004), it has been suggested that
attentional switching is in fact facilitated by the ventral attention
network acting as a “circuit breaker” (Marois et al., 2000; Cor-
betta and Shulman, 2002; Shulman et al., 2002, 2007; Chambers
et al., 2004) whose function is to interrupt an ongoing cognitive
task to reorient attention to different behaviorally relevant sensory
information (Serences et al., 2005) even at the same spatial loca-
tion (Greenberg et al., 2010). Therefore, color segmentation would
aid in disengaging from one surface and reorienting to the other
surface, speeding the attentional switch. In this model, the ventral
attention network affects the speed of visual processing, whereas
the dorsal attention network is instead linked to conscious percep-
tion as it likely mediates attenuation of direction repulsion due to
increased segmentation from bottom-up motion features such as
speed and spatial frequency.
CONSCIOUSNESS
Pre-attentive processing could subserve color effects on the seg-
mentation and direction discrimination stages. Attentional mech-
anisms could underlie color effects on the direction discrimina-
tion, decision-making, and attentional switching stages. Based on
the magnitude of the color segmentation effect, it is likely more
than one stage is affected. These potential attentional mechanisms
add to the growing body of evidence that, under certain circum-
stances, attention and consciousness can be dissociated (Braun
and Sagi, 1990; Braun and Julesz, 1998; Kentridge et al., 1999a,b,
2004; Tsushima et al., 2006, 2008; van Boxtel et al., 2010a for a full
review). For example, in blindsight, attention can be directed to
a stimulus even though the stimulus is not consciously perceived
(Kentridge et al., 1999a,b, 2004). In fact, an unseen distractor in the
blind ﬁeld inhibits saccades to consciously perceived targets in the
intact visual ﬁeld (Rafal et al., 1990) similar to a visible distractor in
normal participants, i.e., the oculomotor distractor effect (Walker
et al., 1995, 1997). As another example, Tsushima et al. (2006,
2008) showed that subthreshold motion coherence (consciously
invisible direction) was more distracting in an RSVP task than
was suprathreshold motion coherence. Those studies have used
stimuli that do not reach conscious awareness to produce a disso-
ciation between attention and consciousness. In the current study,
color segmentation did not alter conscious perception of direc-
tion, suggesting that in this case processing speed and conscious
perception are somehow dissociated even when the stimuli do
reach conscious awareness. With or without color segmentation,
participants were consciously aware of one of the directions on
nearly every trial. Furthermore, with increased presentation time
(∼1500ms) of the two surfaces, participants were aware of both
directions of motion even when they were the same color (Exper-
iment 2, unicolor condition). Thus, color segmentation only sped
the entry of motion information into awareness without altering
the illusory percept, even though the task required attending to
both the color and direction of each surface. This may be due to
pre-attentive bottom-up mechanisms, attentional mechanisms, or
a combination of the two.
CONCLUSION
We ﬁnd that adding color segmentation cues to superimposed
objects speeds motion processing, without affecting the misper-
ception of their directions in the direction repulsion illusion. This
is in contrast to featureswithin the dorsal stream, speciﬁcally speed
and spatial frequency, which do affect conscious perception of
motion direction, as measured by a reduction in the illusory repul-
sion. It remains unknown whether those dorsal stream features
also speed motion processing or just affect motion perception.
Color segmentation affects the speed but not the quality of the
direction computation. Speed and spatial frequency affect the
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quality of the direction computation (and may or may not affect
the speed of processing). So for color segmentation there is a disso-
ciation between speed of processing, i.e., the time required to reach
conscious awareness, and the conscious percept in that aware-
ness. We propose four stages at which color segmentation may
speed processing: segmentation, switching, direction discrimina-
tion, and decision-making. The dissociation seen between color
segmentation and the conscious perception of the direction repul-
sion illusion is likely due to color and motion being processed
separately by the dorsal and ventral visual streams, whereas the
cross-talk between the streams still allows for speeded processing.
In summary, we have shown that a consciously perceived feature
of an object can speed the processing of other features of the
same object without affecting the outcome of their perceptual
processing.
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